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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 18, 2003, twenty-four-year-old Los Angeles Lakers star Kobe Bryant 
was charged with the sexual assault of a nineteen-year-old hotel concierge.1  Under a 
gag order, both Bryant and his accuser declined to discuss the facts of the case.2  
However, sources close to Bryant disclosed one side of the story.3  According to 
these sources, the accuser initially consented to sexual intercourse.4  During sexual 
                                                                
1Kobe Bryant Charged with Sexual Assault (Dec. 16, 2003), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/07/18/kobe.bryant/index.html. 
2Allison Samuels, Kobe Off the Court, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 13, 2003, at 51. 
3Id. at 52. 
4Id.  
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intercourse, Bryant expressed concern that he was not using a condom.5  Shortly 
thereafter, the accuser expressed her desire to cease sexual intercourse.6  On 
September 1, 2004, less then one week before opening statements were slated to 
begin, charges against Bryant were dismissed with prejudice.7  Had the charges not 
been dropped, Bryant’s future may have hinged on a single question: Does a 
revocation of consent during sexual intercourse nullify prior consent?   
Approximately one week after the charges against Bryant were filed, Illinois 
Governor Rod Blagojevich signed Senate Bill 406 into law.8  Pursuant to Senate Bill 
406, “[a] person who initially consents to sexual penetration or sexual conduct is not 
deemed to have consented to any sexual penetration or sexual conduct that occurs 
after he or she withdraws consent during the course of that sexual penetration or 
sexual conduct.”9  Senate Bill 406 effectively recognizes the right of a person to 
withdraw consent at any point after the commencement of sexual intercourse.10  In 
accordance with Senate Bill 406, a person may be charged with rape despite initial 
consent on the part of his or her sexual partner.11
Since its inception, Senate Bill 406 has been the subject of national debate.  In 
enacting Senate Bill 406, Illinois became the first state to formally recognize the 
crime of “initial consent” rape in its statutory code.12  Moreover, Senate Bill 406 has 
obvious implications in the outcome of cases with similar fact situations to that of 
the prosecution of Kobe Bryant. 
First, this Note will examine the impetus behind the introduction of Senate Bill 
406.  Second, this Note will examine the legal effect of Senate Bill 406 on Illinois’ 
sexual assault laws.  Third, this Note will address problems with the statutory 
recognition of the crime of “initial consent” rape.  Fourth, this Note will address 
problems with the crime of “initial consent” rape within the context of the Illinois 
statutory code.  Fifth, this Note will examine the effects of rape on the victim.  Sixth, 
                                                                
5Id. at 52-53. 
6Id. at 53.  
7Judge Drops Charge Against Bryant (Sept. 1, 2004), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/01/bryant.trial/index.html. 
8Associated Press, New Rape Law Protects People Who Change Mind During Sex (July 
29, 2003), at http://www.highbeam.com/library/doco.asp?docid=1G1:10860%947&teaser= 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
9S.B. 406, 93rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003).   
10The Leader-Chicago Bureau, Illinois’ New Rape Law Raises National Discussion (Aug. 
1, 2003), at http://www.illinoisleader.com/news/newsview.asp?c=7446. 
11Adriana Colindres, Blagojevich Vetoes New Rules on State Lease Arrangements, THE 
STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER (Springfield, Ill.), July 29, 2003, at 12.  Senate Bill 406 is gender 
neutral.  See The Leader-Chicago Bureau, supra note 10.  However, in the majority of rape 
cases, the assailant will be male and the victim will be female.  Studies indicate that male rape 
constitutes only 5 to 10 percent of all reported rapes.  MARY E. WILLIAMS, RAPE 44 
(Greenhaven Press 2001).  For the purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that the assailant 
is male and that the victim is female.  Pronouns will be used accordingly.   
12The Leader-Chicago Bureau, supra note 10. 
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this Note will discuss potential solutions to the problems of Illinois’ amended rape 
law. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Origin of Illinois Senate Bill 406 
Senate Bill 406 was inspired by In re John Z.,13 a recent California Supreme 
Court case.14  In re John Z. involved the alleged rape of a seventeen-year old 
female.15  According to the facts of the case, the victim and the defendant were alone 
in the defendant’s parents’ bedroom.  Prior to sexual intercourse, the victim and the 
defendant engaged in sexual activity that was, for the sake of argument, consensual.  
At one point, the victim was sitting on the edge of the bed with her clothing strewn 
across the room.  The defendant rolled the victim over so that she was lying on her 
back.  Once she was on her back, the defendant began kissing the victim and telling 
her that she had “a really beautiful body.”  The victim said nothing in response to the 
defendant’s conduct.  The defendant then proceeded to achieve sexual penetration.  
The victim testified that after the commencement of sexual intercourse, “she kept 
like trying to pull away.”  She further testified that she informed the defendant that 
she did not want to engage in sexual intercourse at that time and that she needed to 
go home.  Despite the victim’s claimed resistance, the defendant continued to engage 
in sexual intercourse.16  The juvenile court found the defendant guilty of forcible 
rape.17  The California Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in 
appellate court decisions as to whether or not a person had the right to revoke 
consent following the commencement of sexual intercourse.18
The California court system first addressed the concept of a right to revoke 
consent during sexual intercourse in the 1985 case of People v. Vela.19  Vela 
involved the alleged rape of a fourteen-year old female by a nineteen-year old male.20  
The evidence presented at trial was such that a juror could reasonably find that the 
victim initially consented to the sexual intercourse at issue; that the victim revoked 
her consent during the act of sexual intercourse; and that the defendant continued to 
engage in sexual intercourse following the victim’s revocation of consent.21  During 
the deliberation phase of the trial, the jury posed the following question to the trial 
court:  “Once penetration has occurred with the female’s consent, if the female 
                                                                
1360 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003). 
14Matt Bean, Saying Yes, then No: Bryant Case Enters National Debate (Aug. 6, 2003), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/08/05/ctv.bryant.law/index.html. 
15In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 184. 
16Id. at 184-85. 
17Id. at 184. 
18Id.  
19172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).   
20Id. at 239. 
21Id. at 240. 
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changes her mind does force from that point constitute rape?”22  The trial court 
informed the jury that it did not possess an answer to the question.23  The jury 
subsequently found the defendant guilty of rape.24
On review, the California Court of Appeals for the Fifth Appellate District sought 
to determine an answer to the jury’s question.25  In attempting to determine an 
answer to the jury’s question, the court of appeals looked to the essence of the crime 
of rape.26  It identified the essence of the crime of rape as “the outrage to the person 
and feelings of the female resulting from the nonconsensual violation of her 
womanhood.”27  The court of appeals concluded that a victim who initially consented 
to sexual intercourse and later revoked consent during the act of sexual intercourse 
could not experience the same magnitude of outrage as a victim who resisted sexual 
intercourse from the outset.28  As a result, the court of appeals held that the crime of 
rape could not occur in a scenario in which a woman initially consented to sexual 
intercourse and then later revoked her consent during the act of sexual intercourse.29  
The court of appeals did caution, however, that a person who persisted in sexual 
intercourse following a revocation of consent could be subject to other criminal 
charges, namely assault and battery.30  Refusing to recognize the right to revoke 
                                                                
22Id.  
23Id.  The trial court initially answered in the jury’s question in the affirmative.  Id.  After 
further consideration, the trial court advised the jury: “The note that you gave us yesterday, 
quite frankly, is something that took us a while to check on.  And to be candid with you, we do 
not have a definitive answer to the question.”  Id.    
24Id.  
25Id. at 241.  The court of appeals explained that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to 
instruct the jury on general principles of the law.  Id.  The court of appeals further explained 
that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to reinstruct the jury on a principle of law if it was 
apparent that the jury was confused as to the principle of law.  Id.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the trial court committed error by failing to answer the jury’s question.  Id.  
The court of appeals explained that whether or not this error was prejudicial, warranting the 
reversal of the trial court judgment, depended on whether or not the answer to the juries 
question was “yes” or “no.”  Id.  
26Id. at 243. 
27Id.   
28Id.  In arriving at this conclusion, the Vela court consulted the case law of other 
jurisdictions.  See id.  More specifically, the Vela court cited a Maryland case and a North 
Carolina case.  See id.  In Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266, 1271 (Md. 1980), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that a woman could withdraw consent up until the point of 
penetration, but not thereafter.  According to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, if the woman 
withdrew consent following penetration, there could be no rape.  Id.  Likewise, in State v. 
Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761 (N.C. 1979), the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that rape 
could not occur in a situation in which “actual penetration was accomplished with the 
woman’s consent.”  Both of the cases focused on the presence or absence of consent at the 
point of penetration. 
29Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 241. 
30Id.  
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consent during sexual intercourse, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s 
judgment.31
Nearly a decade and a half after Vela was decided, questions as to the right to 
revoke consent during sexual intercourse resurfaced in the California court system.  
People v. Roundtree involved the alleged rape of a fifteen-year old female by a 
thirty-nine year old male.32  The victim ran away from a group home in an effort to 
locate her mother.  Along the way, the victim crossed paths with the defendant, 
whom offered to assist her in her endeavors.  The defendant drove the victim to an 
apartment complex that he supposedly lived in with his sister.  The defendant 
informed the victim that they could not enter the apartment because his sister was 
asleep and then suggested that they take a nap in the car.  At this point in the fact 
pattern, the victim’s and the defendant’s stories diverged.  The victim testified that 
the defendant raped her after she insisted that they resume the search for her mother.  
The defendant testified that the victim initially consented to the sexual intercourse at 
issue.  The defendant further testified that during sexual intercourse, the victim told 
him to stop because she thought she heard someone approaching the car.33  During 
the deliberation phase of the trial, the jury posed the following question to the trial 
court:  “If, after penetration, the female changes her mind and says ‘stop’ and the 
male continues, is this still rape?”34  The trial court responded by saying, “…the fact 
that there was a prior penetration with the consent of the female [did] not negate 
rape.”35  The jury found the defendant guilty of rape.36
On review, the California Court of Appeals for the First Appellate District sought 
to determine whether or not the trial court correctly instructed the jury.37  In 
attempting to do so, it consulted the Vela decision.  The court of appeals 
characterized the Vela decision as being unsound.38  It criticized the Vela court for 
failing to apply the statutory definition of rape to the fact pattern presented.39  The 
court of appeals explained that when the statutory elements of the crime of rape are 
satisfied, “the outrage to the victim is complete.”40  The statutory code defined rape 
as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished … against a person’s will by means of 
force.”41  After considering the statutory definition of rape, the court of appeals 
concluded that rape could occur in a scenario in which a woman initially consented 
to sexual intercourse and later revoked her consent during the act of sexual 
                                                                
31Id. at 244. 
32People v. Roundtree, 77 Cal. App. 4th 846, 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
33Id. at 847-49. 
34Id. at 850. 
35Id.  
36Id. at 847. 
37Id. at 849.  On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in issuing its 
jury instructions.  Id.  
38Id. at 851. 
39Id. at 852. 
40Id.   
41Id.   
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intercourse.42  Recognizing the right to revoke consent during sexual intercourse, the 
court of appeals held that the jury instructions were appropriate and affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment.43    
In In re John Z., the Supreme Court of California adopted the thinking of the 
Roundtree court.  The supreme court noted that there were no means of accurately 
measuring the level of outrage suffered by a person.44  In doing so, the supreme court 
attacked the assumption that the victim who consents to sexual intercourse and 
revokes consent during sexual intercourse does not experience the same magnitude 
of outrage as the victim who resists sexual intercourse from the outset.45  The 
supreme court further noted that outrage to the person was not an element of the 
crime of rape.46  The supreme court held that “a withdrawal of consent effectively 
nullifies any earlier consent and subjects the male to forcible rape charges if he 
persists in … nonconsensual intercourse.”47   
The California court system spent three years trying to clarify the definition of 
sexual assault.48  Approximately six weeks after the Supreme Court of California 
decided In re John Z., Illinois lawmakers introduced Senate Bill 406.  At the time, 
                                                                
42Id.  In arriving at this conclusion, the Roundtree court, like the Vela court, consulted the 
case law of other jurisdictions.  See id.  The Roundtree court noted that several states had 
rejected the Vela court’s reasoning.  Id.  In State v. Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 962 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 1994), the Appellate Court of Connecticut was asked to interpret the word “intercourse” as 
it appeared in the state’s sexual assault laws.  The appellant contended that the word 
referenced only initial penetration.  Id.  If this were the case, rape could not occur in a 
situation in which initial penetration was accomplished with consent.  Id.  The Appellate Court 
of Connecticut interpreted the word “intercourse” to include both initial intercourse and 
continued intercourse.  Id.  The court held that continued penetration accomplished in the 
absence of consent and through the application of force constituted rape.  Id. at 963.  In 
rendering its decision, the court stated, “it is a basic principle of law that common sense is not 
left at the courtroom door.  Similarly, in State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. 1995), 
the Court of Appeals of Minnesota explained that the state’s sexual assault laws “provide[d] a 
broader reference point than the moment of slightest intrusion.”  Id.  The court held that “rape 
include[d] forcible continuance of initially-consensual sexual relations.”  Id. 
43Roundtree, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 852. 
44In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 186. 
45Id.   
46Id.   
47Id. at 184.  The Supreme Court of California upheld the defendant’s conviction.  Id.  
Justice Brown dissented.  Id. at 188.  Brown acknowledged the right of a woman to revoke 
consent during sexual intercourse.  Id.  Brown criticized the majority for failing to consider 
whether or not the victim’s statements amounted to a revocation of consent.  Id.  He noted that 
a reasonable mistake as to the issue of consent was a defense to rape.  Id.  He further noted 
that “initial consent” rape cases were likely to involve credibility contests.  Id.  Brown also 
criticized the majority for failing to establish more explicit guidelines for future cases.  Id.  
The majority did not set a time period in which a person had to cease sexual intercourse 
following a revocation of consent.  Id. at 190.  The majority also did not state whether or not 
persistence constituted force.  Id.   
48Robert Baxter, Law Re-Examines Consensual Sex, ROCKFORD REGISTER STAR, July 18, 
2003, at 11A. 
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Illinois’ sexual assault law strongly resembled California’s sexual assault law.49  
Proponents of Senate Bill 406 characterized the legislation as a preventative measure 
against judicial controversy.50  Senator Dan Rutherford, a cosponsor of Senate Bill 
406, explained, “with Illinois and California’s laws being very similar, we wanted to 
craft a bill that would prevent us from going down the same path in Illinois that 
California did.”51     
B.  Effect of Senate Bill 406 on Illinois’ Sexual Assault Laws 
The Illinois statutory code defines criminal sexual assault as “an act of sexual 
penetration by the use of or threat of force.”52  Pursuant to this definition, the crime 
of sexual assault possesses two actus reus elements: sexual penetration and either the 
use of force or the threat of the use of force.  The Illinois statutory code defines 
sexual penetration as “any contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of 
one person by an object, the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person, or any 
intrusion, however slight, of any part of the body of one person, into the sex organ or 
anus of another person ….”53  This definition does not limit sexual penetration to the 
act of initial intrusion.  The definition of sexual penetration can be read to include 
both the act of initial intrusion and the act of sexual intercourse.  The Illinois 
statutory code provides that the force element of criminal sexual assault can be 
satisfied in one of two situations.54  The first situation occurs “when the accused 
threatens to use force or violence on the victim or on any other person, and the 
victim under the circumstances reasonably believe[s] that the accused ha[s] the 
ability to execute the threat.”55  The second situation occurs “when the accused 
overcome[s] the victim by use of superior strength or size, physical restraint or 
physical confinement.”56  The preceding statutory language does not deprive a person 
of the right to revoke consent during the act of sexual intercourse.  Theoretically, a 
person could have been charged with the crime of “initial consent” rape before the 
enactment of Senate Bill 406. 
Senate Bill 406 does not change the definition of sexual assault within the state 
of Illinois; Senate Bill 406 merely clarifies the definition of sexual assault within the 
state of Illinois.57  Senator Dan Rutherford stated that “the goal [of Senate Bill 406] 
was not to change Illinois law as it pertains to sexual assault, but more simply to 
                                                                
49See id. 
50Associated Press, New Illinois Rape Law Protects People Who Change Mind During 
Sex, available at www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,93245,00.html (July 29, 2003) [hereinafter 
Associated Press]. 
51Baxter, supra note 48. 
52720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(a)(1) (1998).  
53720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-12(f) (1998).  
54See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-12(d) (1998).  
55720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-12(d)(1) (1998).  
56720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-12(d)(2) (1998). 
57Laura Jastram, Bill Ensures “No Means No” in Illinois, DAILY ILLINI (Champaign, Ill.), 
July 30, 2003, at 1.  
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clarify what most people believe the law says.”58  According to Rutherford, Illinois 
lawmakers wanted to clarify once and for all that “no meant no.”59  In reaction to the 
enactment of Senate Bill 406, Ross Wantland, coordinator of the sexual assault 
education program at the University of Illinois, stated, “no always meant no.”60  She 
further stated that from a legal perspective, Senate Bill 406 contributed little to 
Illinois’ sexual assault law.61  When asked about Senate Bill 406, Robert Shapiro, a 
defense attorney in the O.J. Simpson case, responded by saying that the legislation 
was likely to be unnecessary.62
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Inherent Problems in Recognizing the Crime of “Initial Consent” Rape 
1.  Limitations on Evidence 
In “initial consent” rape cases, prosecutors will have trouble amassing the 
evidence necessary to prosecute alleged assailants.  Given the nature of the crime, 
evidence will be limited.  For example, prosecutors typically will not have access to 
eyewitnesses.  In an “initial consent” rape case, the sexual intercourse at issue is 
initially consensual.  Consensual sexual intercourse often occurs in a private 
environment.63  As a result, a third party is not likely to witness the crime. 
Prosecutors have traditionally relied on the results of medical examinations in 
prosecuting rape claims.64  Following incidents of rape, victims may seek medical 
attention.65  Most hospitals follow a similar protocol for treating rape victims, 
namely the rape kit.66  A rape kit includes the instructions and materials necessary to 
collect and preserve forensic evidence of rape.67  During a rape kit examination, 
medical personnel perform a very methodical procedure.68  This procedure is aimed 
                                                                
58Colindres, supra note 11. 
59Jastram, supra note 57.  
60Id.  
61Id. 
62The Leader-Chicago Bureau, supra note 10.  Wendy Murphy, director of the Victim 
Advocacy and Research Group in Boston, adopted a similar attitude.  See Associated Press, 
supra note 50.  In reaction to Illinois’ amended rape law, Murphy issued the following 
statement: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.  I don’t think that it was broke.”  Id.   
63See Wendy McElroy, Law Needs New Category of Sexual Assault, at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,95069,00.html (Aug. 19, 2003). 
64See JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD 
CRIME 222 (1993). 
65See id. 
66Gathering Medical Evidence: What will Happen to Me in the Hospital?, at 
http://www.nd.edu/~ucc/ucc_sexualvictimhospital.html (last modified Feb. 20, 2004). 
67ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 226. 
68Id. at 227. 
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towards the recovery of foreign fluid, foreign hair, and foreign tissue from the body 
of the victim.69  
Prosecutors use the rape kit to establish the identity of the assailant and the act of 
sexual intercourse.  For obvious reasons, the rape kit has little, if any, evidentiary 
value in an “initial consent” rape case.  In an “initial consent” rape case, the primary 
issue is the withdrawal of consent.  The identity of the assailant and the act of sexual 
intercourse will have already been established. 
In the course of performing a rape kit examination, medical personnel will 
examine the victim’s body for external physical injury.70  Bruises and abrasions are 
indicative of resistance on the part of the victim.  Such marks will tend to prove a 
withdrawal of consent.  Unfortunately, bruises and abrasions will not be 
commonplace in an “initial consent” rape case.  The victim will withdraw consent 
while engaged in sexual intercourse with the assailant.  Presumably, the assailant 
will be in position to combat resistance without inflicting significant bodily injury. 
In approximately two-thirds of all reported rape cases, the victim exhibits no 
external physical injury.71  This statistic has led to the increased use of the 
colposcope in rape cases.72  The colposcope is a “microscope on wheels” that enables 
physicians to examine the female reproductive track at a magnification of up to 
fifteen times.73  With the colposcope, physicians are able to identify subtle changes 
in the female reproductive track.74
Laura Slaughter, medical director of the Suspected Abuse Response Team for 
San Luis Obispo County, California, has conducted extensive research on the 
application of colposcopy to rape cases.75  In a 1993 study, Slaughter compared 
colposcope photographs taken from rape victims with colposcope photographs taken 
from women who engaged in consensual sexual intercourse.76  Slaughter found 
evidence of genital trauma in 89 percent of the rape victims and only 15 percent of 
the women who engaged in consensual sexual intercourse.77
                                                                
69See JOHN M. MACDONALD, RAPE:  CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES 146 (1995); see also ALLISON 
& WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 228 (providing rape kit instructions for a crime lab in 
Missouri). 
70See ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 227. 
71ROB HALL, RAPE IN AMERICA 105 (1995). 
72See id.  The colposcope was originally used as a diagnostic test for uterine cancer.  Id. 
73Id. 
74Kristen Wood, Instrument Used to Detect Rape Evidence (Sept. 29, 2000), available at 
www.localnews8.com/stories/september2000/29/rapeinstr.htm. 
75HALL, supra note 71, at 106. 
76Id.  
77Id.  The mean number of injury sites on women who sustained genital trauma through 
consensual sexual intercourse was one.  Id.  In contrast, the mean number of injury sites on 
women who sustained genital trauma through rape was three.  Id.  Slaughter attributed 
differences in the degree of genital trauma to the position of the pelvis during sexual 
intercourse.  Id.     
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In an earlier study, Slaughter attempted to identify the types of internal injuries 
detected through colposcopy.78  Slaughter found that the internal injuries most 
frequently detected occurred at the point of initial contact between the penis and the 
vagina.79  She described these injuries as “mounting injuries.”80  In an “initial 
consent” rape case, a victim will unlikely sustain “mounting injuries” because sexual 
penetration is consensual.  Thus, the colposcope, much like the rape kit, will be of 
diminished evidentiary value. 
Prosecutors have been known to employ the use of the polygraph in rape cases 
lacking eyewitnesses and physical evidence.81  The polygraph is an instrument that 
monitors an individual’s autonomic nervous system responses.82  Theoretically, when 
an individual lies, there will be notable deviations in his or her blood pressure, pulse 
rate, respiration rate, and galvanic skin response.83  The key word in the preceding 
sentence is “theoretically.”  Polygraphs are not completely accurate.84  Polygraphs 
have been known to yield false results, especially when the subject is of a nervous 
disposition.85  Moreover, there are ways to defeat the polygraph.86  For example, 
some subjects state a proposition over and over again until they accept its truth.87  
Some categories of persons have been deemed wholly unsuitable for polygraph 
testing.88  Such categories of persons include, but are not limited to, the following: 
psychopathic liars, alcoholics, persons who are hungry or thirsty, persons with heart 
conditions, persons with colds, and persons on medication.89  Due to concerns 
surrounding the accuracy of the polygraph, some jurisdictions have restricted the use 
of the polygraph and the admissibility of polygraph results in criminal trials.90   
                                                                
78Id. 
79Id.  The most frequent injury was tears to the posterior fourchette.  Id.  The second most 
frequent injury was abrasions to the labia minor.  Id.  The third most frequent injury was 
ecchymosis to the hymen.  Id. 
80 Id.   
81See MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 146. 
82Ben Clark, Trial by Ordeal? Polygraph Testing in Australia, 7 MURDOCK UNIV. ELEC. 
JOURNAL OF LAW 1 (Mar. 2000), at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7n1/ 
clarke71_text.html. 
83Id. 
84MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 146. 
85Clark, supra note 82. 
86Id. 
87Id. 
88Id. 
89Id. at n.4. 
90Id.  Illinois restricts the use of the polygraph and the admissibility of polygraph results in 
criminal trials.  Pursuant to the Illinois statutory code,  
In the course of a criminal trial the court shall not require, request, or suggest that the 
defendant submit to a polygraphic detection deception test, commonly known as a lie 
detector test, to questioning under the effect of thiopental sodium, or to any other test 
or questioning by means of a mechanical device or chemical substance. 
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2.  Potential for False Accusations and Wrongful Convictions 
The unfounded rate of rape exceeds that of any other Crime Index crime.91  Many 
motives underlie false reports of rape.92  Most motives fall within one of four 
classifications: alibi motives, revenge motives, financial motives, or attention 
motives.93  False reports of rape are detrimental because they tie up police and 
judicial resources.94  Moreover, false reports of rape disrupt the lives of the defendant 
and those persons close to the defendant.  In the worst-case scenario, a false report 
can culminate in a wrongful conviction. 
On July 8, 1979, Cathleen Crowell, who at the time was sixteen years old, 
engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with her boyfriend.95  Shortly thereafter, 
Crowell grew nervous that her boyfriend might have impregnated her.96  The 
following night, she “ripped the buttons off [of her] clothing, scratched [her] body 
with a piece of broken glass, made a mark around [her] vaginal area and pinched and 
bruised [herself] and did other things to make it appear that [she] had been violently 
attacked.”97  She then stood on the outskirts of a road near a shopping mall and 
flagged down a police officer.98  With tears in her eyes, Crowell informed the officer 
that three men abducted her in the shopping mall parking lot and that one of those 
men violently raped her.99  The officer took Crowell to a hospital, where a rape kit 
examination was performed.  Later at the police station, Crowell worked with a 
sketch artist, who was able to draw up a composite sketch of the fictitious 
assailant.100  Unfortunately for twenty-two-year old Gary Dotson, the composite 
sketch resembled him.101  With the assistance of police, Crowell identified Dotson as 
                                                          
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-19.  Like Illinois, California also restricts the use of the polygraph 
and the admissibility of polygraph results in criminal trials.  California law provides that 
polygraph results are inadmissible unless all parties stipulate to their admission.  CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 351.1 (2004). 
91HALL, supra note 71, at 16.  Not all unfounded reports are false reports.  Unfounded 
reports are those reports that have been determined to be false or for which there is insufficient 
evidence to support the offense.  Id.  In 1991, the unfounded rate of rape was 8 percent.  Id.  In 
that same year, the average unfounded rate for all other Crime Index crimes was 2 percent.  Id.   
92MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 87.  
93Id. 
94See id. at 85. 
95Center on Wrongful Convictions, The Rape that Wasn’t – The First DNA Exoneration in 
Illinois (Sept. 8, 2003), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/ 
exonerations/Dotson.htm [hereinafter Center on Wrongful Convictions]. 
96Id.  
97MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 84. 
98Center on Wrongful Convictions, supra note 95.  
99Id.  
100Id.  
101Id.  
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the assailant.102  Dotson was convicted of rape and sentenced to twenty-five to fifty 
years in prison.103  Today, with the enactment of Feminist rape reform legislation and 
with the recognition of the crime of “initial consent” rape, Crowell would not have 
had to have gone to such great lengths in making a false report of rape.    
a.  Feminist Rape Reform 
In 1960, approximately 36 percent of women worked outside the home.104  Ten 
years later, as the decade drew to a close, more than 50 percent of women worked 
outside of the home.105  Some men resisted the integration of women into the 
workplace, “view[ing] women’s newfound assertiveness and involvement in the 
public sphere as an attack on traditional roles and a defiance of chivalry.”106  The 
increased presence of women in the public sphere, which was accompanied by 
adamant opposition from some men, increased opportunities for victimization.107  As 
women gained ground in the workplace, they began to voice their dissatisfaction 
with social policies that adhered to traditional gender roles.108  One area of focus was 
rape law.109  “Feminists charged that the law of sex legitimated a societal order in 
which the sexual abuse of women was commonplace.”110
The feminist movement is responsible for two significant rape reforms: the 
elimination of the physical resistance requirement and the enactment of rape shield 
laws.111  Traditionally, physical resistance was an element of the crime of rape.112  
Prosecutors were required to prove that the victim physically resisted her assault.113  
The victim’s physical resistance served as evidence of lack of consent.114  Feminists 
                                                                
102Id.  
103Id.  In 1985, Crowell retracted her rape claim.  Id.  By this time, Dotson had served 
more than half a decade in prison.  Id.  The judge did not believe Crowell’s retraction.  Id.  
However, with public sentiment mounting, Illinois Governor James Thompson commuted 
Dotson’s sentence to the time already served.  Id.  On August 14, 1989, DNA evidence 
officially exonerated Dotson of the crime of rape.  Id.  Dotson became the first person in 
Illinois to be exonerated of a crime through the application of DNA testing.  Id. 
104CONFRONTING RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 40 (Mary E. Odem & Jody Clay-Warner 
eds., 1998) [hereinafter CONFRONTING].  
105Id.  
106Id.  
107Id.  
108Id.   
109Id. at 41.  
110Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 777, 796 (1988). 
111Id. at 799.  
112Dana Berliner, Note, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE L.J. 
2687, 2691 (1991).  
113Id.  
114Id.  
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challenged the physical resistance requirement of rape on the grounds that it 
“prescribed a course of action that significantly increased [the victim’s] chances of 
suffering additional physical injury.”115  Feminist pressures effected change in 1974, 
as Michigan passed landmark rape reform legislation.116  The rape reform legislation 
shifted the focus from the victim’s actions to the defendant’s actions.117  It phased out 
the physical resistance requirement by defining the crime of rape solely in terms of 
the amount of force applied by the defendant.118  Michigan’s rape reform legislation 
had a domino effect.  Today, a majority of states have eliminated the physical 
resistance requirement.119      
A majority of states have also enacted rape shield laws.120  Generally, rape shield 
laws prohibit a defendant from presenting testimony as to a victim’s prior sexual 
history.121  From a feminist perspective, rape shield laws serve three purposes.  First, 
rape shield laws “counter the assumption that a promiscuous woman [is] more likely 
to consent to [sexual intercourse] than a virgin.”122  Second, rape shield laws prevent 
the fact-finder from punishing the victim for what may be deemed to be an 
unacceptable lifestyle.123  Third, rape shield laws protect victims from a second 
victimization on the stand.124
b.  “Initial Consent” Rape in Light of Feminist Rape Reform 
The statutory recognition of the crime of “initial consent” rape coupled with the 
enactment of feminist rape reform legislation encourages false accusations of rape.  
                                                                
115Chamallas, supra note 110, at 799.  
116CONFRONTING, supra note 104, at 45.  
117Chamallas, supra note 110, at 799.  
118Id.  
119Berliner, supra note 112, at 2692.  
120A M. JOHNSON & ROBERT T. SIGLER, FORCED SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IN INTIMATE 
RELATIONSHIPS 23-24 (1997).  By 1990, more than forty states had rape shield laws.  Id.  
121ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 178-79.  Rape shield laws vary from 
state to state.  JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 24.  The most restrictive rape shield 
laws are those that exclude evidence as to a victim’s sexual history with anyone but the 
defendant.  Id.  Illinois enforces a restrictive rape shield statute.  Pursuant to the Illinois rape 
shield statute  
[T]he prior sexual activity or the reputation of the alleged victim … is inadmissible 
except (1) as evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim … 
with the accused when this evidence is offered by the accused upon the issue of 
whether the alleged victim … consented to the sexual conduct with respect to which 
the offense is alleged; or (2) when constitutionally required to be admitted. 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-7.  Some individuals believe that the Illinois rape shield statute is 
too restrictive.  These individuals have criticized the statute for failing to acknowledge certain 
situations in which evidence of the victim’s sexual history might be pertinent.  See 
MACDONALD, supra note 69, at 176. 
122JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 23. 
123Chamallas, supra note 110, at 800.  
124See ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 178.  
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There is an inherent limitation on the availability of evidence in an “initial consent” 
rape case.  As a result, law enforcement personnel and prosecutors will expect less 
from the alleged victim in terms of evidence.  Moreover, just as there is a lack of 
evidence to prove an act of “initial consent” rape, there is a lack of evidence to prove 
a false accusation of “initial consent” rape.  At trial, the alleged victim is not required 
to establish physical resistance, or the lack of consent that logically follows from 
physical resistance.125  In some states, that burden now rests on the defendant.126  
Furthermore, the alleged victim is protected from intrusive questions into her sexual 
history.127  She is shielded from verbal abuse and harassment.128   
In the wake of feminist rape reform, statutory recognition of the crime of “initial 
consent” rape creates a legitimate threat of wrongful conviction.  A charge of “initial 
consent” rape will oftentimes entail a “he said, she said” scenario, and nothing 
more.129  In the absence of physical evidence and eyewitnesses, prosecutors will be 
inclined to attack the defendant’s character.  As a result, the outcome of the case will 
depend largely on the perceived credibility of the victim and the defendant.  In a case 
that boils down to a credibility contest, the defendant is at a clear disadvantage.  
Rape shield laws prohibit the defendant from using the victim’s sexual history to cast 
doubt on the victim’s claimed revocation of consent.130  At one time, physical 
resistance served as an objective measure of consent.131  With physical resistance as 
an element of rape, the issue of consent was not subject to misinterpretation by the 
defendant or the jury.132  The same cannot be said today. 
c.  Procedural and Societal Safeguards  
Admittedly, there are both procedural and societal safeguards against the threat 
of wrongful conviction.  For example, prosecutors tend to prosecute only those rape 
cases in which there is sufficient evidence of the assailant’s guilt.133  In cases that are 
                                                                
125See Berliner, supra note 112, at 2692.  
126See Chamallas, supra note 110, at 800.  Illinois recognizes consent as a defense to 
criminal sexual assault.   
Pursuant to the Illinois statutory code, It shall be a defense to any offense under 
Section 12-13 through 12-16 of this Code where force or threat of force is an element 
of the offense that the victim consented.  “Consent means a freely given agreement to 
the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question.  Lack of verbal or physical  
resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force 
by the accused shall not constitute consent.  
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17. 
127ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 178. 
128Id.  Some individuals view the enforcement of rape shield statutes as a violation of the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. 
129See McElroy, supra note 63.  
130JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 23.  
131Berliner, supra note 112, at 2696. 
132Id.  
133See HALL, supra note 71, at 22.  In 1988, there were approximately 15,562 rape 
convictions in the United States.  Id.  Of those convictions, 77 percent resulted from a guilty 
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prosecuted, jurors tend to be skeptical of alleged victims.134  Rape myths are 
“prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists.”135  
One of the most widespread rape myths is that the victim “asked for it.”136  This rape 
myth shifts blame from the defendant to the victim.137  “[Rape] myths combine to 
create a climate hostile to rape victims, a climate in which the victim is blamed for 
the rape.”138  Defense attorneys are well aware of the prejudicial attitudes towards 
rape.  At trial, defense attorneys attempt to feed off of such attitudes.139  Judges 
themselves tend to adopt a certain degree of partiality towards the defendant when 
the alleged victim’s character or behavior is questionable.140  A judge’s attitude 
towards parties is important because it is the judge who maintains control of the 
courtroom and renders decisions as to the admissibility of evidence.141  In the end, 
the standard of proof for “initial consent” rape is the same as that of all other crimes.  
Prosecutors must prove the elements of rape beyond a reasonable doubt.142
Despite the existence of such procedural and societal safeguards, wrongful 
convictions do occur, as is evident from the Gary Dotson case.  The public invests 
trust in prosecutors, judges, and jurors; however, prosecutors, judges, and jurors 
cannot always be trusted.143  A 1987 study found that since the dawn of the twentieth 
century, more than 350 people had been wrongfully convicted of crimes punishable 
                                                          
plea.  Id.; see also Berliner, supra note 112, at 2687.  Research indicates that prosecutors are 
less likely to prosecute when the victim and the assailant are acquaintances than when the 
victim and the assailant are strangers.  Id. 
134In a criminal trial, the defendant has some discretion as to the fact-finder.  ALLISON & 
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 64, at 179.  Prior to the commencement of a trial, the defendant may 
request that a judge determine the verdict.  Id.  Nonetheless, most rape trials are decided by a 
jury.  Id. 
135JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 94.  
136Id.; see also COLLEEN A. WARD, ATTITUDES TOWARD RAPE:  FEMINIST AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 43-45 (1995).  In a 1977 survey conducted by Barnett and Field, 
34 percent of the respondents agreed that “a woman should be responsible for preventing her 
victimization in rape.”  Id. at 44.  In a 1988 survey conducted by Ward, 46 percent of the 
respondents disagreed that “men, not women, are responsible for rape.”  Id.  In a 1991 survey 
conducted by Holcomb, 22 percent of the respondents agreed that “any woman could prevent 
rape if she really wanted to.”  Id. at 45.   
137JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 94. 
138CONFRONTING, supra note 104, at 252.   
139A defense attorney once began a rape trial by attempting to insert a pencil into the 
opening of a spinning Coke bottle.  Id. at 39.  The purpose of the demonstration was to 
convince the jury that a woman could avoid an act of rape if so desired.  Id.  In effect, the 
defense attorney was attributing blame to the victim.   
140See WARD, supra note 136, at 105-06.  
141Id. at 105.  
142Jeff Goldblatt, Illinois First State to Pass ‘No Means No’ Law (Aug. 20, 2003), at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,95277,00.html.  
143See LISA STOLZENBERG & STEWART J. D’ALESSIO, CRIMINAL COURTS FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 356 (1999). 
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by death.144  Of those 350 people, 116 were sentenced to death.145  Of those 116 
people, twenty-three were executed.146  In In re Winship, the Supreme Court of the 
United States established the principle that it is better to let a guilty person go free 
than to convict an innocent person. 147  “The greatest injustice that any society can 
perpetrate is to convict, and possibly even put to death, an innocent person.”148         
B.  Problems with the Crime of “Initial Consent” Rape Within the Context  
of the Illinois Statutory Code 
1.  Ambiguous Language 
“Criminal law’s must obvious weak spot [in addressing the crime of rape] is its 
vagueness.”149  Despite continuous efforts to reform rape law, standards for 
determining the existence of rape remain uncertain.150  In a 1992 survey, 22 percent 
of the female respondents reported that a man had forced them to engage in sexual 
intercourse.151  In the same survey, 3 percent of the male respondents reported they 
had forced a woman to engage in sexual intercourse.152  Researchers attributed the 
discrepancy to a general misconception as to the legal definition of “force.”153  
Vague statutory language is problematic in that it does not adequately inform 
citizens of their rights.  The potential defendant is unaware of the legal limits of his 
actions.  Likewise, the potential victim is unable to recognize when she has a valid 
claim. 
                                                                
144Id.  
145Id. 
146Id.  
147In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).  In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan wrote:   
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense 
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon 
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 
conviction.  Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every 
individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime where there is 
reasonable doubt about his guilt.  As was said in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 
525-26 (1958), “There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in 
factfinding, which both parties must take into account.  Where one party has at stake 
an interest of transcending value – as a criminal defendant his liberty – this margin of 
error is reduced as to him by the process of placing the other party the burden of … 
persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt” beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 363-64. 
148STOLZENBERG & D’ALESSIO, supra note 143, at 356.  
149RAPE 144 (Mary E. Williams ed., 2001). 
150Id. 
151Id.  
152Id. 
153Id. at 145. 
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The Illinois statutory code fails to clearly define the crime of “initial consent” 
rape.  For instance, the code does not specify what constitutes a withdrawal of 
consent.154  The code also does not specify the time period in which a sexual partner 
has to cease sexual intercourse following a withdrawal of consent.155  Illinois 
lawmakers have reserved such questions for the courts. 
2.  Absence of a Graduated Rape Law 
a.  Moral Concerns 
Even more troubling, the Illinois statutory code fails to draw a distinction 
between the behavior of an “initial consent” rapist and the behavior of a stranger 
rapist.156  Illinois does not enforce a graduated rape law.  Pursuant to the Illinois 
statutory code, all first-time acts of rape not involving aggravating circumstances are 
“Class 1” felonies.157  “Initial consent” rapists and stranger rapists are subject to the 
same sentencing guidelines. 
The prosecution of an “initial consent” rapist for the same offense as a stranger 
rapist is morally inappropriate.158  “Initial consent” rapists are not as culpable as 
stranger rapists.  Concededly, the “initial consent” rapist, like the stranger rapist, 
may intend to violate the victim.  However, unlike the stranger rapist, the “initial 
consent” rapist will formulate this intent during an excited sexual state. 
Oftentimes, an act of “initial consent” rape will be the product of 
miscommunication.  Men possess a more sexualized view of the world than 
women.159  As a result, men are sometimes insensitive to signals conveyed by 
women.160  In an “initial consent” rape case, the victim will say “no” to sexual 
intercourse while she is engaged in the act of sexual intercourse.  By saying “no,” the 
victim may feel that she is clearly expressing her desire to terminate sexual 
intercourse.  However, given the victim’s prior consent, the assailant is prone to 
ignore the victim’s statement.161
Token resistance further complicates matters.  Token resistance is a practice in 
which a woman indicates that she does not want to engage in sexual intercourse even 
though, in actuality, she does want to engage in sexual intercourse and is willing to 
engage in sexual intercourse.162  Women tend to offer token resistance to sexual 
                                                                
154See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17. 
155See id.  
156See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13.  
157Id.  
158See MARK COWLING, DATE RAPE AND CONSENT 132 (1998).  
159See id. at 57.  
160See id. at 58.  
161See id. at 61.  Kanin interviewed self-disclosed date rapists.  Id.  Each of the rapists 
stated that the act of rape was preceded by some consensual sexual activity.  Id.  In 84 percent 
of the cases, this consensual activity involved genital play.  Id.  The rapists stated that the 
intimacies had gone so far that they did not take rejections seriously.  Id.   
162ALLISON & WRIGHTMAN, supra note 64, at 78.  
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intercourse.  In a 1988 study, Muehlenhard and Hollabaugh asked 610 female 
students at Texas A&M University if they ever said “no” to sexual intercourse when 
they really meant “yes.”163  Thirty-nine percent of the students surveyed admitted to 
offering such token resistance on at least one prior occasion.164
Women tend to engage in token resistance in large part because of societal and 
cultural norms.165  Women are expected to say “no” to sexual intercourse regardless 
of their true feelings.166  Consequently, men are reluctant to interpret the word “no” 
as a denial or revocation of consent.167  In a 1987 study, Sandberg, Jackson, and 
Petretic-Jackson asked college students to explain what their dating partners meant 
when they said “no” to sexual activity.168  A majority of the male respondents 
expressed their belief that the word “no” meant “yes.”169
In a study funded by the National Institute of Mental Health, researchers 
conducted a survey of acquaintance-rape victims and stranger-rape victims.170  More 
specifically, researchers questioned the victims as to their reactions during the actual 
commission of the rape.171  Eleven percent of the acquaintance-rape victims reported 
that they screamed for help during their assault.172  In contrast, 31 percent of the 
stranger-rape victims reported that they screamed for help during their assault.173  In 
comparison with the stranger-rape victims, twice as many stranger-rape victims 
reported that they tried to flee their assailant.174  Identical proportions of both groups 
reported that they offered resistance to their assailant.  Seventy percent of the 
                                                                
163Id. at 78-79.  
164Id. at 79.  Of those women who admitted to engaging in the practice of token resistance, 
32.5 percent reported doing it only once, 45.6 percent reported doing it two to five times, 11.2 
percent reported doing it six to ten times, 7.8 percent reported doing it eleven to twenty times, 
and 2.9 percent reported doing it more than twenty times.  Id.   
165JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 22; see also RAPE, supra note 149, at 61. 
From very early ages, men and women are conditioned to accept different roles.  
Women are raised to be passive and men are raised to be aggressive.  We are 
conditioned to accept certain attitudes, values and behaviors.  Our conditioning is 
continuously and relentlessly encouraged and reinforced by the popular media, 
cultural attitudes and the education system. . . . Social training about what is proper 
and ladylike, as well as what is powerful and macho, teaches women to be victims and 
men to be aggressors.  
166JOHNSON & SIGLER, supra note 120, at 22. 
167See id. 22-23. 
168Id. at 96.  
169Id.  
170RAPE, supra note 149, at 154.  
171Id.  
172Id. 
173Id.  
174Id.  
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acquaintance-rape victims and 70 percent of the stranger-rape victims indicated that 
they struggled with their assailant.175   
Although identical proportions from the two groups reported offering resistance, 
independent evidence suggests that the stranger-rape victims may have offered more 
substantial resistance than the acquaintance-rape victims.  Research has revealed a 
curvilinear relationship between the amount of force applied by the assailant and the 
degree of acquaintance between the victim and the assailant.176  A possible 
explanation for the curvilinear relationship is that the stranger-rape victim offers 
more resistance than the acquaintance-rape victim.  Therefore, the assailant must 
counter more resistance with more force.   
In all likelihood, the “initial consent” rape victim will be less likely than the 
acquaintance-rape victim to scream, run, and resist.  The degree of acquaintance will 
probably be greater between the “initial consent” rape victim and the assailant than 
the typical acquaintance-rape victim and the assailant.  After all, the relationship 
between the “initial consent” rape victim and the assailant will have already 
progressed to the level of some consensual sexual activity.  In the absence of definite 
signals of non-consent, the “initial consent” rapist may not perceive his act as an act 
of force.  
b.  Practical Concerns 
The absence of a graduated rape law also has practical implications.177  Without a 
graduated rape law, a jury might be apt to engage in the practice of jury 
nullification.178  Some rape laws mandate a maximum life sentence.179  A jury that 
finds a defendant guilty of “initial consent” rape may nonetheless acquit because it 
does not feel that the defendant’s actions warrant such a severe punishment.180  
While an “initial consent” rapist might not be as culpable as a stranger rapist, he or 
she should not go unpunished. 
Criminal law is dominated by two theories of punishment: the utilitarian theory 
and the retributive theory.181  Although the two theories employ different approaches 
in determining the justification of punishment, the two theories can hardly be 
considered opposites.182  The utilitarian theory justifies punishment whenever there is 
                                                                
175Id.  
176Id. at 29.  Koss, Dinero, Siebel, and Cox found that marital rapes involved the most 
violence and that acquaintance rapes involved the least violence.  Id.  Stranger rape fell in 
between the two.  Id.   
177See COWLING, supra note 158, at 132.   
178The term “jury nullification” refers to “a jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the 
evidence or refusal to apply the law either because the jury wants to send a message about 
some social issue that is larger than the case itself or because the result dictated by law is 
contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 389 
(2d pocket ed. 2001). 
179See COWLING, supra note 158, at 132.  
180See id. 
181JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 31 (2d ed. 1999). 
182A third theory of punishment, the mixed theory, is a combination of the utilitarian 
theory and the retributivist theory.  FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 63 (Leo Katz et al. eds. 
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a net social gain.183  Under the utilitarian theory, if the benefit to society outweighs 
the harm to the defendant and the defendant’s family, the punishment is justified.184  
Social gains of punishment may include the following: general deterrence, specific 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.185  
Generally, the “initial consent” rapist will be one of two types: the “initial 
consent rapist who misinterprets the actions of his sexual partner or the “initial 
consent” rapist who formulates intent during the heat of passion.  In the case of the 
“initial consent” rapist who has misinterpreted his sexual partner, punishment yields 
only one social benefit, general deterrence.  Without actual punishment, the threat of 
punishment will lose its effect.186  Nevertheless, the benefit of general deterrence will 
not suffice to offset the harm experienced by the defendant and the defendant’s 
family. 
In the case of the “initial consent” rapist who has formulated intent during the 
heat of passion, punishment may yield several social benefits.  For example, the 
punishment may serve to notify other members of society of the potential 
consequences of their actions.  The punishment may serve to physically prevent the 
individual from striking again.  Along the same lines, the punishment may serve to 
condition the individual so that he does not strike again.  Undoubtedly, there will be 
instances where there is a net social gain.  However, this does not mean that the 
“initial consent” rapist should be punished to the same extent as the stranger rapist.  
Given the circumstances of the crime, the “initial consent” rapist will require less 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation than the stranger rapist.       
The application of the retributive theory is more straightforward than the 
application of the utilitarian theory.  Individuals understand and utilize the retributive 
theory to justify punishment on the grounds of just deserts.187  Retributivists live by 
the oft-quoted phrase “an eye for an eye.”  The retributive theory identifies a good in 
punishment.188  However, this good does not take the form of social gain.189  “The 
good that punishment achieves is that someone who deserves it gets it.”190  
Under the retributive theory, the “initial consent” rapist who acts with intent 
deserves to be punished.  He has deprived the victim of her personal freedom.  
Moreover, as will be discussed shortly, he has inflicted the victim with 
psychological, and possibly physical, injury.  Although the “initial consent” rapist 
deserves to be punished, he does not deserve to be punished to the same extent as the 
stranger rapist.  As previously noted, the stranger rapist tends to act with more 
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violence than the acquaintance rapist.191  Furthermore, stranger rapes are often 
premeditated.  In an “initial consent” rape, intent, if it exists, is developed during a 
heightened emotional state.  Whether a juror resorts to a utilitarian line of reasoning 
or a retributive line of reasoning, he or she will be hesitant to convict an “initial 
consent” rapist when the mandated sentence is the same as that of the stranger rapist. 
C. Effect of Rape on the Victim 
The Justice Department estimates that one in seven women will be raped during 
her lifetime.192  For that unlucky one in seven, the act of rape will crack, if not 
completely shatter, the world around her.  Rape has profound physical and 
psychological effects on the victim.193  Generally, the rapist will apply some degree 
of force to subdue the victim.194  Depending on the rapist, force may be the 
motivating factor behind the act of rape itself.195  As a result, the victim may sustain 
some physical injury during the act of rape.196  In some scenarios, the victim will 
walk away from the assault physically unscathed.197  While some victims manage to 
avoid physical injury during the act of rape, nearly all victims must deal with some 
form of post-rape physical injury.  Psychological injury tends to manifest itself 
physically.198  
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forego the application of force. 
198See HALL, supra note 71, at 94.  Rape victims commonly experience “[l]oss of appetite, 
nausea, vaginal or oral pain and irritation, and stress-induced illness.”  Id.  In addition, studies 
have found a correlation between rape victimization and alcohol or drug use.  See id.  A study 
of rape victims in Tulsa, Oklahoma, found that 23 percent of the rape victims increased their 
alcohol or drug use following their assault.  Id.   
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“[A]ll rape victims suffer from rape trauma syndrome to some degree.”199  Rape 
trauma syndrome “describe[s] a predictable stress response pattern [that] a victim . . . 
typically displays following an assault.”200  Rape trauma syndrome may be divided 
into two phases, the acute crisis phase and the long-term reaction phase.201  The acute 
crisis phase deals with the victim’s immediate reactions to the assault.202  This phase 
can last anywhere from days to weeks to months.203  The emotions of anxiety and 
fearfulness dominate this phase.204  The victim is prone to fall into a state of severe 
depression.205  Multiple studies have found that at least three in ten sexual assault 
victims consider suicide.206  During the acute crisis phase, the victim frequently 
replays the act of rape in her mind.207  Fixation on the act of rape commonly prevents 
the victim from falling asleep.208  When the victim finally does fall asleep, she 
ordinarily has nightmares about the assault.209   
The long-term reaction phase commences when the victim attempts to pick up 
the pieces of her once structured world.210  A primary symptom of this stage is the 
development of a phobia, “an irrational fear . . . [that] interferes with effective 
adaptation to one’s environment.”211  For example, a victim who is raped in an unlit 
environment might develop a fear of the dark.  As a result, she might leave on the 
lights in her home twenty-four hours a day. 
During the long-term reaction phase, the victim commonly encounters difficulties 
in restoring the facets of everyday life.212  The victim commonly has trouble 
reestablishing a normal eating pattern.213  Some victims are unable to consume food 
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on a regular basis.214  Other victims view food as a temporary solution to their 
problems.215  Similarly, the victim commonly has trouble re-establishing a normal 
sleeping pattern.216  For many victims, the nightmares experienced during the acute 
crisis phase carry over into the long-term reaction phase.  In severe cases, the 
psychological consequences of rape cause insomnia.217  Perhaps the greatest hurdle 
for the victim is the resumption of sexual activity.  Rape victims often report a 
diminished sex drive or arousal level.218  Due to this diminished sex drive or arousal 
level, some victims find that they are unable to orgasm.219  For some victims, the 
resumption of sexual activity triggers flashbacks to the assault.220  The duration of 
the long-term reaction phase varies with the victim.221  Some victims will never fully 
recover from their assault.222    
In addition to rape trauma syndrome, 65 percent of rape victims suffer from post-
traumatic stress syndrome.223  Post-traumatic stress syndrome is defined as “the 
development of characteristic symptoms following a psychologically distressing 
event that is outside the range of usual human experience.”224  All persons suffering 
from post-traumatic stress syndrome exhibit two symptoms.225  First, the person 
becomes preoccupied with the traumatic event, reliving it over and over again in 
their mind.226  Second, the person exhibits a reduced responsiveness to the 
environment in which they function.227  In addition to the two aforementioned 
symptoms, a person suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome must exhibit at 
least two of the following symptoms: difficulty sleeping, irritability, difficulty 
concentrating, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, and physiological 
reactivity upon exposure to events related to the traumatic event.228  Of the six 
secondary symptoms, studies indicate that rape victims most often experience 
difficulty concentrating, hypervigilance, and physiological reactivity upon exposure 
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to events related to the assault.  Rape trauma syndrome and post-traumatic stress 
syndrome overlap in several respects.229  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Nonconsensual sexual intercourse has destructive effects on an individual’s 
physical and mental health.  Given the prevalence of nonconsensual sexual 
intercourse, destruction to the individual translates into destruction to society.  State 
lawmakers should take an active approach towards deterring individuals from 
committing acts of forced sexual intercourse.  However, this is not to say that state 
lawmakers should sacrifice basis tenets of American legal jurisprudence in pursuing 
these ends.  The enactment of laws recognizing the crime of “initial consent” rape 
could very well help curb the destructive effects of forced sexual intercourse.  This is 
not at issue.  What is at issue is the attitude of such laws towards the defendant.  
Laws recognizing the crime of “initial consent” rape should not function to stack the 
deck, so to speak, against the defendant.  As Matthew Hale, a British jurist, once 
proclaimed, “rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and 
impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered that it is an 
accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved; and harder to be defended by the 
party accused, though ever so innocent.”230
This note does not support the proposition that states should refuse to recognize 
the crime of “initial consent” rape.  Statutory recognition of the right to revoke 
consent during sexual intercourse is justifiable on several grounds.  As previously 
noted, nonconsensual sexual intercourse is damaging to both the victim and society.  
From a retributive perspective, forced sexual intercourse warrants punishment.  From 
a utilitarian perspective, punishing the offender promotes the well being of society.  
In a society that strives for equality, laws restricting the right to revoke consent after 
penetration are dominantly male oriented.231  Such laws “reinforce the idea that, 
beyond a certain point in a sexual encounter, men are powerless to stop.”232  As a 
result, such laws deprive women of sexual freedom.233  Furthermore, the right to 
revoke consent is a fixture in American legal jurisprudence.  For example, the law of 
torts recognizes the right of the property owner to revoke consent as to entrance onto 
his or her property.234  In the event of a revocation of consent to enter onto property, 
the licensee or the invitee must make a conscious effort to exit the property.  If no 
such effort is made, he or she will be held liable for trespass.235  One could easily 
make a more compelling argument for the right to revoke entrance into one’s body 
than for the right to revoke entrance into one’s home.236  
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This note does support the proposition that states should refuse to recognize the 
crime of “initial consent” rape in a manner consistent with the Illinois’ statutory 
code.  As it stands, Illinois’ amended rape law is plagued with problems.  At the 
heart of these problems are problems concerning the defendant’s rights.  Illinois’ 
amended rape law fails to afford adequate protection to the defendant.  The problem 
of inadequate protection is a byproduct of both the nature of “initial consent” rape 
and the statutory language in which the crime is framed. 
An inherent problem of the crime of “initial consent” rape is that of limited 
evidence.  Given the nature of “initial consent” rape, prosecutors will have a difficult 
time amassing evidence of the crime.  As a result, prosecutors will be inclined to 
focus on issues of credibility.  For the defendant who finds himself in the midst of a 
credibility contest, rape shield laws serve as a serious handicap.  Rape shield laws 
restrict the defendant from introducing evidence as to the alleged victim’s sexual 
history.  Unable to refer to the alleged victim’s sexual past, the defendant will have a 
more difficult time establishing that there was no revocation of consent. 
The problem of limited evidence underlies two other inherent problems, false 
accusations and wrongful convictions.  The unfounded rate of rape already exceeds 
that of any other Crime Index crime.237  Inherent limitations on evidence act only to 
encourage false accusations.  Prosecutors and judges will expect less from the 
alleged victim in terms of evidence.  Prosecutors and judges will also have a difficult 
time identifying fictitious claims.  The prevalence of false accusations coupled with 
the “he said, she said” nature of “initial consent” rape cases creates an environment 
ripe for wrongful conviction.  Admittedly, the standard of proof remains that of 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”  However, it must be recognized that a jury of 
laypersons must apply this standard.  Although some jurors may harbor prejudicial 
attitudes toward alleged victims, it cannot be said that all will. 
A lawmaker’s hands are tied in dealing with the problem of limited evidence.  
Lawmakers, like everyone else, must await the development of improved methods of 
collecting and preserving evidence of rape.  While lawmakers are handcuffed in 
dealing with the problem of limited evidence, they can erect safeguards against false 
accusations and wrongful convictions.  For example, lawmakers can impose more 
stringent sanctions on persons who make false accusations of “initial consent” rape.  
Likewise, lawmakers can relax the enforcement of rape shield laws in “initial 
consent” rape cases.  The relaxation of rape shield laws would accomplish two 
objectives.  First, it would deter persons from making false accusations.  Presumably, 
a person would think twice about filing a false report if their public history was 
subject to public disclosure.  Second, it would give the innocent defendant much 
needed ammunition in credibility contests.  Lawmakers can also reinstate the 
physical resistance element in “initial consent” rape cases.  The reinstatement of the 
physical resistance would accomplish three objectives.  First, it would make it 
difficult to prosecute frivolous claims.  Second, it would ensure that that the 
defendant received adequate notice of the victim’s revocation of consent.  Third, it 
would provide the fact-finder with an objective measure of consent, thus limiting 
possibilities of error.       
Lawmakers are better equipped to deal with statutory problems than with 
inherent problems.  In dealing with statutory problems, lawmakers need only 
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restructure the statutory language.  Illinois’ amended rape law suffers from the 
problem of ambiguity.  The Illinois statutory code does not define what constitutes a 
revocation of consent.  Furthermore, the Illinois statutory code fails to indicate the 
time period in which an individual has to cease sexual intercourse following a 
revocation of consent.  As a result, members of the public are not fully informed of 
their rights.  Ignorance as to one’s rights can, and often does, lead to the commission 
of crime.  Illinois’ lawmakers can solve the problem of ambiguity by passing bills 
containing the requisite information. 
Illinois’ rape law is also problematic in that it does not subdivide the crime of 
rape into varying offenses.  In the absence of a graduated rape law, statutory 
recognition of the crime of “initial consent” rape generates both moral and practical 
concerns.  Illinois’ lawmakers can put these concerns to rest by amending the rape 
law so as to recognize different rape offenses with different sentencing guidelines.  
In such a system, lesser offenses can be reserved for those rape crimes in which 
consent is dubious.  Such rape crimes include date rape, “initial consent” rape, and 
marital rape.  A graduated rape law like the one described would protect the 
defendant who misinterprets signals or the defendant who gets caught up in the 
moment from excessive punishment.  A graduated rape law like the one described 
would also protect society against jury nullification. 
Through the enactment of Senate Bill 406, Illinois became the first state to 
formally recognize the crime of “initial consent” rape.  Inevitably, other states will 
consider following suit.  Lawmakers would be well-advised to approach the crime of 
“initial consent” rape with caution.  As is evident from an analysis of Illinois’ 
amended rape law, statutory recognition of the crime of “initial consent” rape can 
have dangerous ramifications. 
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